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Citizens have a right to be governed by oﬃ  cials with 
an acute awareness of the conﬂ icts between the consti-
tutional values of liberal democracy. Such an awareness 
is an integral part of a public oﬃ  cial’s integrity. Th at is 
why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to 
remove from oﬃ  ce an oﬃ  cial with such integrity. In this 
article, this type of conﬂ ict between constitutional values 
is translated into the terms of an individual oﬃ  cial’s 
decision making with the help of moral theory. Th is yields 
two paradoxes: one focusing on the decision maker and 
the other on the object of his or her decisions: the citizen. 
Th ese paradoxes lead to the following questions: If run-
ning a liberal democratic constitution essentially involves 
moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by oﬃ  -
cials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if oﬃ  cials 
with that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs 
because of complexity, do not we owe them something like 
political forgiveness? Th e paradoxes are used to formulate 
conditions for political forgiveness.
While the integrity of a public oﬃ  cial is mul-tifaceted and complex, it certainly includes the endorsement of values enshrined in 
the constitution that, in the words of the late John 
Rohr (1986), he or she has to “run.” But what if these 
values clash violently in a moral dilemma? Such is 
the predicament of the police oﬃ  cer in the following 
real-life case.
On September 27, 2002, Jakob von Metzler, son 
of a Frankfurt-based private banker, is kidnapped 
by 27-year-old law student Magnus Gäfgen. In a 
letter to Jakob’s parents, Gäfgen demands a ransom 
of 1 million Euros. Two days later, the kidnapper is 
identiﬁ ed while collecting the money. Th e next day, 
on September 30, Gäfgen is arrested by the Frankfurt 
police. During interrogation, Gäfgen consistently 
misinforms his interrogators as to the whereabouts of 
Jakob. At one point, Gäfgen tells them to go and take 
a look at a cottage near a lake not far from Frankfurt. 
In the cottage, police oﬃ  cers ﬁ nd a bed with blood-
stained blankets. Th ey surmise that if Jakob is still 
alive, he is likely to be in serious danger.
In the early morning hours of October 1, 2002, all 
this is reported to the responsible oﬃ  cer, Wolfgang 
Daschner, vice president of the Frankfurt police. After 
20 minutes of agonizing deliberation, Daschner orders 
Gäfgen’s interrogators to threaten him with what is 
in eﬀ ect a (relatively mild) form of torture. When the 
latter is confronted with the threat, he at once gives 
way. Gäfgen reveals that Jakob is no longer alive. On 
October 14, he gives a full confession. More than 
half a year later, on July 27, 2003, he is convicted for 
abduction and homicide. He is sent to prison for the 
rest of his life.
Having issued the order, Daschner informs the 
Staatsanwalt, or public prosecutor. Th e public pros-
ecutor, who, according to German penal law, has no 
discretionary authority to decide whether or not to 
prosecute, has no choice but to start an investigation. 
Meanwhile, Daschner is demoted as a result of an 
internal disciplinary measure. His new task consists 
of performing menial administrative chores, awaiting 
his case to be examined in court. On February 20, 
2004, Daschner is indicted, and in December of that 
year, he is convicted. Th e sentence is mild: he gets 
a conditional ﬁ ne (Verwarnung mit Strafvorbehalt) 
of 10,800 euros. Th e relevant article of the German 
penal code (§ 59 Strafgezetzbuch), which is seldom 
applied, makes it possible to punish someone formally 
without punishing him materially. Th e newspapers 
aptly comment that Daschner has been convicted 
but not punished. Th e case again receives a lot of 
exposure in the German media in 2011. In August of 
that year, Gäfgen successfully seeks compensation for 
having been threatened with torture by the authori-
ties: the state has to pay him 3,000 euros (Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, October 10, 2012). A wave of 
public moral indignation washes over Germany. 
Th e reputable German weekly Die Zeit comments, 
“Rechtens, aber nicht richtig” (Legal, but not right) 
(Die Zeit, August 4, 2011).
Cases of this kind should make a citizen of any liberal 
democracy think—and think hard. Such a case brings 
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case, the individual, deserving the protection of his or her inalien-
able rights, stands alone against the overwhelming majority. If it 
seeks redress in court, that frequently means a conﬂ ict of values has 
been well under way for some time. Admittedly, this is not the only 
type of conﬂ ict found in the running of a liberal democracy. But 
what is important is that this type of conﬂ ict is hardwired into its 
constitutional substance. Th erefore, it is not just a quirk of fate that 
such conﬂ icts occur. On the contrary, it is part of the very purpose 
of a liberal democracy. One could even say that this type of con-
ﬂ ict of values is itself a good. It forces public oﬃ  cials to constantly 
renegotiate constitutional priorities, thereby keeping the relevant 
values alive.
Rights constrain the choices that individual oﬃ  cials have to make 
because of their special status. Th is status is special in at least 
two respects. In the ﬁ rst place, rights are (in the words of Ronald 
Dworkin) “trumps” (Dworkin 1977). Th ey have to have a particu-
larly strong claim against other kinds of value. Second, rights are 
justiﬁ ed in a way that is nonconsequentialist. Th at is to say, rights 
are conceived of as intrinsically valuable, not just because respect-
ing them has beneﬁ cial consequences. Th is is the reason rights are 
often formulated in an absolute way. For instance, Article 2.2 of the 
United Nations Convention Against Torture reads, “No exceptional 
circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat or war, 
internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be 
invoked as a justiﬁ cation of torture” (emphasis added).1 Making 
rights subject to the consequentialist (or utilitarian) calculus puts 
them on a slippery slope—and a slippery slope is a “natural progres-
sion” toward humanitarian disaster (Williams 1985).
By contrast, the justiﬁ cation of general welfare claims is particularly 
hospitable to utilitarian justiﬁ cation—which is why in modern 
liberal democracies, utilitarianism is considered the “leading public 
philosophy” (Goodin 1995). Th is means that pitting rights against 
welfare claims not only results in a conﬂ ict between diﬀ erent kinds 
of constitutional value in liberal democracy. It also means that we 
have here a conﬂ ict between diﬀ erent patterns of justiﬁ cation of 
those values. Th e strict absolutist will respect the intrinsic nature of 
rights, regardless of the consequences, while the die-hard utilitarian 
has to consider only their consequences. Th is means that the conﬂ ict 
between individual rights and a democratic conception of the com-
mon good that is typical of liberal democracy is a manifestation of 
a deeper conﬂ ict. Th e origin of this deeper conﬂ ict is moral or value 
pluralism.2 Th e central claim of value pluralism is that (1) our moral 
universe contains a plurality of ﬁ nal ends that (2) may conﬂ ict in 
such a way that no rational way out is possible (3) without remain-
der (Berlin 1969; Crowder 1994; Galston 2002, 2005; Hampshire 
1983, 1989, 1999; Kekes 1993; Larmore 1987, 1996, 2008; Raz 
1986; Williams 1981).
As to (1), a plurality of values is a presupposition of true moral 
conﬂ ict. But that does not mean that the amount of ﬁ nal ends is 
indeﬁ nite. Value pluralists usually hasten to point out that they are 
not moral relativists. Th e latter hold that the value systems of diﬀ er-
ent cultures with speciﬁ c moral outlooks cannot be rationally com-
pared with each other as a matter of principle. Value pluralists do 
not claim that intercultural comparison is per se impossible. More 
important for present purposes is (2). Th is clause tells us that true 
moral conﬂ ict cannot be solved by practical reason. Th is is because 
sharp focus to the complex relationships between a society’s moral 
intuitions, its formal institutions, and the demands of everyday 
administrative practice. Th e case may duly be characterized as a 
tragic one. It is a deﬁ ning feature of tragedies that their heroes come 
to grief. So does Daschner. Th ere is nothing we can do about that.
Th is article refuses to indulge such resignation. It hopes to ﬂ esh 
out a justiﬁ cation for preserving oﬃ  cials like Daschner for public 
service. Its aim, however, is primarily diagnostic. Its central conten-
tion is that in cases like Daschner’s, we should redirect our attention 
from the outcomes to the nature of the choice situation. It argues 
that those oﬃ  cials who make themselves guilty of a moral wrong in 
such conﬂ icts have a right to be forgiven. Th e reason is that citizens 
have a right to be governed by oﬃ  cials with an acute awareness of 
the conﬂ icts between the constitutional values of liberal democracy. 
Such an awareness is an integral part of a public oﬃ  cial’s integ-
rity. Th at is why citizens should have a say in deciding whether to 
remove from oﬃ  ce an oﬃ  cial with such integrity.
Th e argument unfolds as follows. Th e ﬁ rst step shows that the 
conﬂ ict of values at the heart of liberal democracies is meant to 
be there; it can even be considered a good thing. With the help of 
moral theory, this type of conﬂ ict is translated into the terms of an 
individual oﬃ  cial’s decision making. Th is yields two paradoxes: one 
focusing on the decision maker and the other on the object of his 
or her decisions: the citizen. Th ese paradoxes lead to the following 
questions: If running a liberal democratic constitution essentially 
involves moral complexity, should we not try to have it run by 
oﬃ  cials with a sensitivity to that complexity? And if oﬃ  cials with 
that sensitivity are bound to commit moral wrongs because of com-
plexity, do not we owe them something like political forgiveness? 
Th e paradoxes are then used to formulate conditions for political 
forgiveness. For the purposes of the argument pursued here, I adopt 
the existing technical term “political forgiveness” and deﬁ ne it as a 
publicly performed performative speech act that aims to create the 
possibility for an oﬃ  cial to continue in oﬃ  ce despite his or her vio-
lation of the moral values embodied in the constitution. However, 
I can only start to explain the elements of this deﬁ nition once the 
paradoxes are in place.
Two caveats should be inserted before the argument starts. As indi-
cated, the purpose of this article is to ﬁ nd a justiﬁ cation for forgive-
ness, not institutional embodiments of political forgiveness. Second, 
the real-life case serves mainly expository grounds. It does not try to 
make a substantive moral point about the rightness or wrongness of 
(the threat of ) torture.
Liberal Democracy as an Expression of Value Pluralism
Th e point of calling a democracy “liberal” is to indicate that it is a 
polity in which the rule by the majority is moderated, “tempered,” 
or checked by mechanisms and institutions that are designed 
to prevent popular tyranny. Th e ways of doing this are familiar: 
prominently among them are individual rights and the separation of 
powers.
Th is is, or should be, stock knowledge. However, because it is stock 
knowledge, we tend to lose sight of it. What should be stressed here 
is that the very label “liberal democracy” captures a deep conﬂ ict 
that is at the heart of all constitutions deserving it. In the extreme 
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of the two paradoxes capture two diﬀ erent perspectives: one is the 
perspective of the oﬃ  cial, the other that of the citizen. Th ey are, 
in fact, two descriptions of one and the same state of aﬀ airs. What 
unites these paradoxes, despite their diﬀ erent perspectives, is the 
point that on a value-pluralist construction of liberal democracy, the 
public oﬃ  cial not only has to be committed to the conﬂ icting values 
but also to the conﬂ ict between these values. Th is may seem a quib-
ble, but it is not. Th e point is that it matters to the integrity of an 
oﬃ  cial who is aware that what he or she faces is in fact an insoluble 
conﬂ ict—which is why he or she has to have an appreciation of the 
heterogeneous nature of the (justiﬁ cation of the) values involved. It 
will turn out that this awareness plays a decisive role in answering 
the question of whether to mete out political forgiveness.
Two Paradoxes: Paradox 1
Unsurprisingly, the ﬁ rst paradox concerns the moral psychology of 
the oﬃ  cial. Th e sense of the claim that the public oﬃ  cial is commit-
ted to the conﬂ ict between liberal-democratic values is this: because 
moral conﬂ ict is extremely painful, individual agents have a natural 
psychological incentive to circumvent, evade, or deny it. In gen-
eral, individuals will adopt strategies, whether conscious or not, to 
avoid moral conﬂ ict. Th is is not diﬀ erent in organizational contexts, 
which in some respects facilitate ways of dodging responsibility. 
Recognizing and dealing with moral conﬂ ict requires virtues such as 
truthfulness, courage, and competence, which indubitably belong to 
an oﬃ  cial’s integrity (Nieuwenburg 2004). So does the responsive-
ness to moral conﬂ ict.
Th e ﬁ rst paradox, then, is this: although the conﬂ ict of values 
enshrined in liberal democracy may be a good thing from a consti-
tutional point of view, it certainly is a bad thing from a psychologi-
cal, subjective perspective. Th at is why it is meaningful to speak 
of a commitment to the conﬂ ict itself. But this paradox also shows 
why it is a non-negligible accomplishment to stand up to a moral 
dilemma. Even possession of the virtues of truthfulness and cour-
age does not turn moral conﬂ ict into something easy to confront. 
Th erefore, from the perspective of the oﬃ  cial, strong reasons count 
against its acceptance. Th is is one reason not to take that acceptance 
as a matter of course. For it registers something that is really there: 
it is an institutional, even a constitutional fact (Searle 1995, 2010). 
And it is a requirement of integrity to take account of the facts—
and to shape one’s actions accordingly.
Two Paradoxes: Paradox 2
Th e formulation of the second paradox requires that we take up the 
perspective of the citizen. What does it mean for citizens that public 
oﬃ  cials are aware of a commitment to conﬂ icting values?
To throw the importance of this awareness into relief, let us think 
of an oﬃ  cial, A, who is a full-blooded consequentialist. Oﬃ  cial A 
believes that actions are exhaustively and exclusively justiﬁ ed by 
their results. If the result turns out to be good, the action is good; 
if the result is bad, the action is bad as well. Oﬃ  cial A decides to 
threaten a suspect with torture because he believes this is fully justi-
ﬁ ed because of the intended consequences (saving, say, hundreds of 
innocent people). Nonetheless, he is removed from oﬃ  ce because 
he has committed a moral wrong. Of course, he disagrees with 
that removal because he believes his decision to be right without 
remainder. Obviously, A is the consequentialist version of Daschner. 
the values are incommensurable, which means that they cannot be 
rationally compared in terms of an overarching value. In other 
words, the logical structure of a moral dilemma rationally underde-
termines the choice between its horns (Crowder 1994). Finally, the 
phrase “without remainder” in (3) refers to the fact that by picking 
any alternative, we make ourselves guilty of a moral wrong. For that 
reason, we shall, if we are relatively normally functioning human 
beings, be tormented by feelings of guilt, shame, and regret. Of 
course, such remainders would be preempted, in principle, if the 
dilemma could be solved in a rationally satisfactory manner. In that 
case, the choice problem simply vanishes.
Signiﬁ cantly, in newspaper interviews, Daschner described his 
decision as a Güterabwägung (a weighing of goods) (Frankfurter 
Rundschau, October 4, 2002). Th is is signal evidence that he was 
aware of the value-pluralist nature of the ﬁ x in which he found 
himself. If it had been a matter of “choosing the lesser of two evils,” 
it would not have been a dilemma. Choosing the lesser of two evils 
assumes a way to compare them in terms of a common measure. On 
such an interpretation, it is perfectly rational (in utilitarian terms) to 
choose the lesser evil. On Daschner’s own interpretation, however, 
he had to choose between two heterogeneous goods. He construed it 
as a choice between, on the one hand, the protection of an individ-
ual right and, on the other hand, a consequentialist task to protect 
the welfare of as many citizens as possible. Th at in his particular 
situation it was only one citizen does not alter the fact that the justi-
ﬁ cations of these values were fundamentally diﬀ erent. It was a tragic 
choice, and he deeply regretted having to make it.
Th eories of value pluralism, however, address us as human beings 
rather than as inhabitants of a certain role or function. At least 
two emendations should be made to tailor value-pluralist dilem-
mas to the context of public organizations in a liberal democracy. 
In the ﬁ rst place, public decisions are typically taken in contexts 
of organizational hierarchy. Hierarchy, however, promotes moral 
contagion, both in upward and downward directions. Contagion 
sinks in the hierarchical structure because the decisions of superiors 
have to be carried out by subordinates. Dilemmas may be, and often 
are, delegated down the line. And when they are, they sometimes 
are transformed: Should one carry out the order or be disloyal? 
Should Daschner’s subordinates uncritically carry out his orders? 
Th e Adolf Eichmann case has shown that hierarchy and loyalty do 
not absolve the subordinate civil servant from moral responsibil-
ity (Arendt 1963). Moral contagion also travels upward, as formal 
structures of responsibility often have implications for superiors who 
have made no (direct) causal contribution to moral wrongs com-
mitted by subordinates. Second, many decisions made in organi-
zations have implications that transcend the boundaries of these 
organizations. One should not forget that the criminal judge in 
Daschner’s case was facing a legal version of his dilemma. She could 
not possibly ignore the strictly absolutist claim of the ﬁ rst article of 
Germany’s Basic Law (to the eﬀ ect that human dignity is inviolable, 
or unantastbar). On the other hand, she had to take into account 
the general police duty to protect German citizens (Abwehrpﬂ icht). 
Organizational decisions often spill over into other organizations.
So much for stage setting. Enough material has been gathered to 
frame two paradoxes following from this value-pluralist interpreta-
tion of liberal democracy. It should be noted that the formulations 
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
4 Public Administration Review • xxxx | xxxx 2014
Govier 1999, 2002; Griswold 2007; Holmgren 1993; Lang 1994; 
Murphy and Hampton 1988; North 1987; Richards 1988).
Political Forgiveness
Th e importance of the citizen perspective cannot be stressed too 
strongly. In the ﬁ rst place, the account presented here is not driven 
by considerations of criminal and/or restorative justice (Adams 
and Balfour 2008; Digeser 2001; Griswold 2007, 39). Th is is not 
to say that these considerations are not valid or that they should 
be replaced by the reﬂ ections presented here. Th e introduction of 
political forgiveness is not intended to substitute for legal action, 
whether of a criminal or civil nature, but focuses instead on discipli-
nary measures. Th e point of a disciplinary measure is not retribution 
but the improvement of the institution. It goes without saying that 
improvement here includes moral improvement. Second, in a liberal 
democracy, all authority exercised over citizens originates in their 
(tacit or express) consent (Simmons 1981). Th is in itself constitutes 
an important, broadly constitutional reason to at least explore the 
possibilities for giving citizens the authority to forgive their oﬃ  cials. 
Th is is a political rather than a legal take on the issue.
Th at is why the relevant concept of forgiveness discussed here is the 
concept of political forgiveness (Digeser 2001). As noted, politi-
cal forgiveness is here taken to consist of a formal speech act with 
performative force aimed at the restoration of a relationship of 
trust between two parties. If a linguistic utterance or speech act has 
performative force, it has practical or even moral consequences. 
It aims to have an impact on the way things are in the world, not 
just to report or describe them (Searle 1969). For instance, if I say 
“John has promised to give me back the money by Monday,” my 
utterance does not have performative force; it just reports a fact, 
namely, that John has made a promise. Th ere is no way this report 
can undo this fact. By contrast, if John himself says “I promise to 
return the money by Monday,” he does not describe or report a state 
of aﬀ airs in the world, but he creates a moral obligation by the very 
act of uttering them. It should be noted that John creates this moral 
obligation irrespective of his intentions. Whether he likes it or not, 
by uttering the sentence, John has committed himself to giving 
back the money. Similarly, by saying “John has forgiven Mary,” I am 
reporting a state of aﬀ airs. My utterance does not aim to impact that 
state of aﬀ airs. But when John states to Mary, “I forgive you,” his 
utterance aims to have an impact on a particular state of aﬀ airs in 
the world, namely, John’s relationship with Mary.
For a performative speech act to be successful, it has to satisfy 
certain conditions. Th us, in an institutional context, certain speech 
acts do not create social facts if the utterer does not have the author-
ity to do so. Someone who does not have the authority to bind 
people in wedlock may utter the words “I hereby pronounce you 
husband and wife” at a wedding ceremony. However, this person 
has not created “hereby” a marriage. Th e conditions of satisfaction 
for a successful speech act of political forgiveness are the following. 
In the ﬁ rst place, the forgiving party has the authority to perform 
that speech act, that is, to forgive. Th is authority, of course, is an 
institutional fact with normative implications. Second, because of 
the public character of political forgiveness, its utterance is subject 
to procedural constraints. Th ese constraints should ensure that the 
speech act is, in principle, publicly accessible. Just as a law is a not a 
law before it is publicly promulgated, an act of political forgiveness 
Suppose another oﬃ  cial, B, believes that torture is absolutely pro-
hibited. No consequence, however beneﬁ cial, can impact his com-
mitment to that value. As a matter of fact, he does not even need to 
consider them, and he remains unimpressed by all if/then scenarios. 
By his lights, his refusal to torture is completely justiﬁ ed. B does not 
torture and is removed from oﬃ  ce because of his failure to discharge 
his task of protecting hundreds of innocent citizens. B, it is clear, is 
the absolutist version of Daschner.
In terms of ethics textbooks, A and B are contraries because they 
represent diametrically opposed varieties of moral reasoning and val-
uing (“Kant versus Mill”). However, if we shift our attention from 
their particular ways of justifying action to their attitude toward the 
structure of the choice situation, A and B are very much alike. Both 
deny a conﬂ ict of values. In this crucial respect, A and B diﬀ er from 
Daschner. A and B are insensitive to the moral complexity of their 
oﬃ  ce, while Daschner does appreciate this. He knows that he has to 
rely on his powers of judgment in particular situations, calibrating 
diﬀ erent claims, and deciding what is best. Daschner’s awareness 
is in tune with the objective value structure of his oﬃ  ce and, by 
implication, of the constitution he is running. Th is makes it deeply 
regrettable that he suﬀ ers the same fate as A and B. His moral 
sensitivity ought to be considered: it should be part and parcel of 
the integrity of public oﬃ  cials. It is part of their integrity because 
systematic neglect of patterns of justiﬁ cation is alien to a liberal-
democratic constitution.
Citizens have an interest in an executive that keeps alive both 
kinds of values and their justiﬁ cations. Th e exercise of moral 
judgment, the marshaling of the right kinds of reason, is indis-
pensable for this. Th erefore, it is in their interest to leave those 
oﬃ  cials who commit a moral wrong where they are: in oﬃ  ce. 
Th e second paradox may be stated as follows: if the citizen has an 
interest in being governed by oﬃ  cials with moral integrity, and if 
responsiveness to moral complexity is an essential part of public 
integrity, citizens have an interest in keeping those oﬃ  cials in 
oﬃ  ce. However, they are treated in exactly the same way as those 
who lack this responsiveness: they are removed from oﬃ  ce—but 
not by citizens.
In fact, the two paradoxes show that tragic choices are tragic twice 
over. Th ey are tragic from both perspectives. What the ﬁ rst para-
dox shows is that oﬃ  cials need certain virtues enabling them to 
recognize, face, and endure moral dilemmas. Such virtues have to 
be acknowledged as an integral part of public integrity. Th is part 
of their integrity, however, takes care that they have an awareness 
of the tragic condition in the ﬁ rst place. What the second paradox 
tells us is that it is in the interest of citizens to have morally sensitive 
oﬃ  cials running their constitution, but such oﬃ  cials face no better 
fate than those who lack this sensitivity. Th is depressing result makes 
one want to look for ways to retain oﬃ  cials with such virtues, even 
if they are guilty of a moral wrong—given that the wrong was the 
outcome of a moral dilemma and they wish to continue in oﬃ  ce. 
Th is paradox shows that this should be done by giving citizens an 
essential part in this project: by giving them the authority to forgive 
the oﬃ  cial. In the last two decades or so, there has been something 
of a revival, or perhaps we should say a resurrection, of the concept 
of forgiveness in the psychological and philosophical literature (see, 
e.g., Calhoun 1992; Enright 2001; Enright and Fitzgibbon 2000; 
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But do not the notions of apologizing and regretting similarly 
originate in interpersonal, and therefore psychological, contexts? 
Why, then, is it allowed to preﬁ x “political” to “apology”? And is 
it an insuperable conceptual problem to do the same with “for-
giveness”? Is not the qualiﬁ cation “political” meant to signal the 
diﬀ erence with “real” forgiveness or, for that matter, apology? If the 
phrase “we regret” in a political context is not a report of senti-
ment, why should not the same go for “we forgive”? Griswold’s 
semantic expulsion of forgiveness from the public realm has a 
question-begging air about it.
Nonetheless, Griswold’s objection points to a deeper and more 
interesting problem. If Griswold is right, then we should not allow 
essentially psychological concepts to infect our discourse about pub-
lic matters. But this would mean that we have to radically overhaul 
our vocabulary—if that is a realistic option at all.
From its very inception, the whole language of politics in the 
Western world has been permeated with terms and expressions 
that derive from nonpolitical contexts. We may talk of “friendship” 
between states, of legal “persons,” and of votes of “no conﬁ dence” 
in a perfectly intelligible (even if metaphorical) way. In this connec-
tion, we should observe that the same goes for the use of “trust” in 
the deﬁ nition of political forgiveness given earlier—a point to be 
addressed in the next section. Th e fact that there is should perhaps 
rather alert us to the question of how fundamental the psychological 
element to the meaning of these terms actually is. It is so deep that 
we no longer realize that all our talk of “organization” ultimately 
refers to the way the “organs” of a living “organism” are arranged 
so that it can optimally discharge its function(s). Organizations 
still have “heads” and “members.” In social practice and theory, 
metaphor is rampant—and perhaps for good reasons. At any rate, 
we seem perfectly able to use and understand these terms in both 
interpersonal and political contexts.
If “we apologize” and “we regret” may be speech acts that aim to 
repair relationships rather than expressing sentiments, there can be 
no principled objection to consider “we forgive” in the same way. 
In sum, there can be no fundamental objection against the use of 
the concept of political forgiveness in the present context. On the 
contrary, it has distinct advantages.
Political Forgiveness and (Political) Trust
In general, the concept of forgiveness allows us to recognize both 
the wrongness of an act or decision and the desirability of continu-
ing a relationship based on trust. As noted, trust is another origi-
nally psychological concept that has proven its use in understanding 
the functioning of representative institutions. Some qualiﬁ cations 
should therefore be appended to the use of this term. It is not 
uncommon to analyze the concept of forgiveness as an action or 
attitude restoring a relationship of trust that has been put under 
pressure by the commission of a wrong (Digeser 1998, 701). 
Typically, such analyses focus on the psychological eﬀ ort made by 
the victim to quench resentment or, as it is sometimes called in the 
literature, “a change of heart” (Calhoun 1992). Some claim that 
forgiveness requires actual purging of resentment (Downie 1965; 
Murphy and Hampton 1988, 157), others a commitment to do 
so (Haber 1991, 7). Psychologically speaking, the reestablishment 
of trust is very diﬃ  cult and, in many cases, a bridge too far. Th is is 
needs publicity in order to be an act of political forgiveness. Finally, 
the subjective states and attitudes of those performing it are irrel-
evant to the success of the speech act (Digeser 2001, 19–21). Th is 
means that those meting out political forgiveness do not need to feel 
resentment toward the person to be forgiven. As will become clear 
presently, this is a consequence of the essentially public character of 
the speech act. Th is does not mean, however, that the state of mind 
of the person to be politically forgiven does not matter. As the ﬁ rst 
paradox shows, it does matter. Actually, it matters a lot.
Taking these conditions of satisfaction into account, we can rehearse 
the deﬁ nition of political forgiveness given earlier. As said, the con-
cept of political forgiveness is here treated as a publicly performed 
performative speech act that aims to create the possibility for an 
oﬃ  cial to continue in oﬃ  ce despite his or her violation of the moral 
values embodied in the constitution. Th e relevance of the concept 
of forgiveness to the public sphere has long been recognized but 
also disputed. However, before I can proceed to formulate condi-
tions of political forgiveness, I have to get out of the way a daunt-
ing objection to the application of the notion of forgiveness to the 
public sphere. Th is is an objection against condition (3) that renders 
irrelevant subjective states of those who dispense forgiveness.
Th e main problem for the application of the concept in the public 
sphere is that forgiveness seems to be an essentially psychological 
concept. Hannah Arendt, for instance, who clearly sees the relevance 
of forgiveness to the political, is acutely aware of its limitations 
because she takes forgiveness to be linked to love (1958, 236–43). 
If forgiveness is an essentially psychological concept, it natural to 
assume that it is at home, primarily or even exclusively, in the sphere 
of the interpersonal. Some even go so far as to deny that there is 
such a thing as political forgiveness at all. In an inﬂ uential study of 
the subject, Henry Griswold argues that this categorical diﬀ erence 
between the public and interpersonal spheres allows no scope for 
forgiveness in the former. What he prefers to call “political apology” 
is not even an imperfect (or “nonparadigmatic”) version of forgive-
ness, despite the fact that they share some characteristics. Because 
forgiveness is conceptually dependent on sentiment or motive, one 
should avoid the term “forgiveness” in discourse about the public 
realm altogether. For one thing, the world of political institutions 
is too complex to assume that all parties are driven by the senti-
ments required to speak of forgiveness. For another, in the public 
sphere, authority is inextricably linked to the idea of representa-
tion, by means of which certain individuals apologize on behalf of 
(groups of ) others. Th ese representatives can and usually do perform 
such speech acts unburdened by the required feelings (resentment, 
a desire for revenge) (Griswold 2007, 59–71, 136–46; cf. Digeser 
2001, 21).
Th ese arguments are not as formidable as they appear. In the ﬁ rst 
place, suppose a conceptual watershed separates the public and the 
interpersonal that renders impossible the semantically responsi-
ble transfer of terms between these spheres. Why would the term 
“political apology” be a better characterization of what happens in 
politics than “political forgiveness”? Griswold argues that “[p]hrases 
such as ‘we regret’ or ‘we apologize’ when uttered in a political con-
text are not reports of sentiments … but are speech acts aiming at 
some diﬀ erent purpose … It would seem that the force of political 
apology is independent of sentiment or motive” (2007, 141–42). 
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convictions) and public values do not fall within the scope of 
political forgiveness. According to certain religious views, it is, for 
instance, not allowed to conclude same-sex marriages. An oﬃ  cial 
may suﬀ er deep-ridden moral conﬂ ict because of this. However, it is 
not a case that is the concern of this article—even though, perhaps, 
the civil servant himself will deny that this is not a matter for others 
to decide. If, on the other hand, his constitution embodies his reli-
gious creed, then it becomes another matter. Th is is not to say that 
this other type of conﬂ ict is not real, important, painful, or in any 
other way worth engaging. It is just not the type of conﬂ ict to which 
political forgiveness applies.
Given these assumptions, the following conditions of forgiveness 
can be formulated.
Political Forgiveness Is Not Justifi cation
As should be clear by now, forgiving an action or decision should 
be clearly distinguished from justifying it. It might be the case that, 
in everyday language, the term “to excuse” is often used indiscrimi-
nately with “to justify.” In philosophical idiom, however, they are 
importantly diﬀ erent. When I justify an action, I literally “make 
right” (iustiﬁ care) that action. If it is justiﬁ ed, a normally function-
ing agent will experience no remainder. In contrast, it makes no 
sense to say that I forgive your action if I mean to imply that the 
action was the right thing to do. Forgiving implies an acknowl-
edgment of wrongness. Th is is one of the semantic features of the 
concept that make it particularly suited to the recognition of value 
pluralism of the liberal-democratic kind.
Th e procedure of forgiving, then, should make unambiguously 
clear that an unjustiﬁ able wrong has been committed. On the other 
hand, it should also be evident that, given the circumstances of the 
decision, there was no alternative to performing it. Th is means that, 
as noted, the administration of political forgiveness should avoid the 
impression that each and every executive violation of a right can be 
forgiven by citizens. Only those wrongs that are, paradoxically, right 
can be forgiven. Th us, if Daschner had made the decision to respect 
the suspect’s rights, in full awareness of the consequences, the same 
would hold. What counts in this type of conﬂ ict is his awareness of 
the dilemma.3
Political Forgiveness Should Be Public
In general, forgiving should be carefully distinguished from forget-
ting. Th e public acknowledgment that a wrong has been done is 
therefore crucial. For this reason, an indispensable part of political 
forgiving should be some kind of public ritual. We can envisage var-
ious ways of devising such a procedure. However, it is of the essence 
that dispensing forgiveness requires a performative speech act that, 
just like a promise, creates an institutional fact (Searle 1969, 1995, 
2010). If I say “I forgive,” I do not report a state of aﬀ airs; I create 
one. In the process, I commit myself to re-creating the relationship 
of trust that the person I forgive has put under pressure. So, even 
though citizens or their representative(s) are not obliged to forgive, 
once they do, they are under an obligation to act as if this relation-
ship has been reestablished. At the same time, it does not create an 
obligation for the oﬃ  cial to remain in oﬃ  ce.
Another reason for making forgiving a public aﬀ air is the following. 
As the aftermath of the Daschner case in Germany shows, events 
particularly the case if there are very direct connections between the 
wronged party, the wrong, and the wrongdoer.
However, such an immediate relationship does not obtain in the 
kind of situation envisaged here. Th e citizen body, conceived as a 
collectivity, is not directly or immediately harmed by the violation 
of the rights of an individual. Nevertheless, this is not so say that 
the notion of trust does not play a role here. Th e role it plays is, for 
obvious reasons, very similar to the notion of trust as employed by 
the tradition of theorizing representative government (Pitkin 1967, 
127–31). In many liberal democracies, especially in parliamentary 
systems, institutionalized forms of trust are an integral element of 
the relationship between the executive and the legislative. It is one 
of the terms used to characterize a relationship vital to the exercise 
of (indirect) democratic control of the executive by the citizen body.
At this juncture, the second paradox asserts itself again. Suppose a 
minister of the interior who is responsible for torture administered 
by a police oﬃ  cial survives a vote of no conﬁ dence in parliament. In 
a very real sense, this minister can be said to be politically forgiven, 
albeit indirectly, by citizens. Yet this is mainly, or even exclusively, a 
matter of political negotiation. Suppose, however, that the subordi-
nate oﬃ  cial responsible for the actual decision to torture, made in 
an insoluble conﬂ ict of values, has to resign as a result of a discipli-
nary measure. From the citizen perspective, this is awkward. If we 
are prepared to give responsible ministers the beneﬁ t of the doubt 
on behalf of the citizen body, we should seriously consider whether 
this can be done for their subordinates as well. Why not allow them 
to reestablish the relationship of trust with the citizen body or its 
proxy?
It is not the purpose here to detail procedures for administering for-
giveness for every form of liberal democratic government. Th is can-
not be done at a general level. Such procedures are, and have to be, 
dependent on their particular legal and political contexts. However, 
one can specify conditions that have to be satisﬁ ed by any procedure 
for politically forgiving subordinate oﬃ  cials. Two constraints should 
guide the formulation of these conditions. Obviously, the condi-
tions should take account of the nature of the paradoxes discussed 
earlier. Second, they should reﬂ ect the relevant properties of the 
concept of political forgiveness. As noted, these properties follow 
from the citizen perspective. But they also have to respect more 
general features of being relevantly tied to value pluralism embodied 
in liberal democracy.
Conditions of Political Forgiveness
Generally speaking, political forgiveness should not be administered 
wantonly. To prevent this, forgiving should be logically connected 
to, and therefore derivable from, basic conﬂ icting moral claims 
embodied in the constitution. A crucial feature of the ﬁ rst paradox 
is that the conﬂ icts of values involved are attributable to the struc-
ture of the constitution. Th ey are, so to speak, internal to what it is 
to serve the state. Put diﬀ erently, the conﬂ ict should be clearly and 
objectively traceable to such constitutional values and not be the 
result of the oﬃ  cial’s own faulty behavior.
Moreover, the relevant moral conﬂ ict should not be a conﬂ ict 
between public and private morality. In general, incompatibilities 
between private values (deriving from, say, the oﬃ  cial’s religious 
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repertoire, in turn, may serve to provide deliberative reasons for 
decision making in the relevant type of cases in the future. However, 
this should not go so far as to constitute a kind of stare decisis. 
Previous decisions should not bind future decisions. Th is is to stress 
the singularity of the case. Forgiving should retain its exceptional 
character. For this reason, the selection of cases qualifying for the 
procedure, and therefore access to the procedure should be carefully 
regimented.
Political Forgiveness Should Be Preceded by Sincere Public 
Apology Directed to Citizens
Typically, apology is the correlative of forgiveness. In an inter-
personal context, apology might not be a necessary condition of 
forgiving. In the context of private life, it is perfectly conceivable 
that one forgives in foro interno, while the wrongdoer shows no sign 
of contrition. Th is may even be considered a mental act of great 
nobility or charity. However, in a public procedure, it is important 
that both sides perform their proper speech acts and that they do 
so in the right order. To return to a point made earlier, one could 
be tempted to see apology and forgiveness as correlatives in a 
public or political context: no political forgiveness without politi-
cal apology. But there is an interesting and crucial asymmetry. In 
the type of case under consideration, the apologizer (the oﬃ  cial) 
is an individual who is not represented by anyone else. His or her 
public apology has to be an expression of genuine regret, guilt, or 
shame. As noted, these feelings are part of the “remainders” that 
are the residues of decisions in moral dilemmas. At the other end 
of the line, those who forgive do represent the citizenry. In their 
case, forgiveness need not be an expression of (backward-looking) 
sentiments.
Conclusion
As noted in the introduction, the ambition of this article is mainly 
diagnostic. I have attempted to ﬂ esh out conditions of political 
forgiveness. A lot more eﬀ ort is needed to translate these conditions 
into workable procedures and institutions. Another task lying ahead 
is the working out of the relationship between political forgiveness 
and forms of retributive and restorative justice. Th is is a technical 
task that cannot be undertaken here. But then again, the focus here 
is on the political dimension of forgiveness. Moreover, a serious 
investment has to be made in thinking of ways to prevent misuse of 
political forgiveness. As is the case with all political and administra-
tive institutions, procedures for administering political forgiveness 
will not be impervious to manipulation. Yet this in itself should 
not be an argument to abandon the project; rather, it should be an 
incentive to think harder.
Forgiving public oﬃ  cials who make themselves guilty of a moral 
wrong so that they can remain in oﬃ  ce is a controversial idea. 
However, in this article, it is argued that under certain condi-
tions, it might be worth taking it seriously. Th ere is something 
intolerably wrong with our theories about public integrity if we 
continue to remove those oﬃ  cials from public service who least 
deserve it. Of course, it would be an illusion to believe that we 
can expel all contingency from our moral universe. At any rate, 
this does not mean that we should not try to reduce the play-
ground of blind fate. Tragedies may end with the demise of the 
hero, but the careers of public oﬃ  cials need not be ruined by 
tragic choices.
such as this serve to bring into sharp relief the very conﬂ ict that is 
at the heart of liberal democracy. It is exactly in such cases that our 
most cherished practices and convictions are put to the test. Th at is 
why they have an important function in keeping alive the awareness 
about both our liberal and our democratic commitments. Th us, 
the public debate in German media stirred up at every stage of the 
torture case brought into focus all the important considerations 
involved in the discussion. Such public debates are tremendously 
important. Th ey force us to exhume the rational justiﬁ cations for 
the things we are routinely doing—preventing our practices and 
convictions from solidifying into inarticulate dogmatism.
Political Forgiveness Should Be Rationally Justifi ed
Th e previous condition is intimately linked to the requirement that 
political forgiveness be adequately supported by reasons. But it is 
important to make a distinction between two sets of reasons, which 
of necessity ﬁ gure in the administration of political forgiveness.
In the ﬁ rst place, the oﬃ  cial to be forgiven will have to make public 
the reasons leading to his or her decision. Ideally, the reasons given 
in the procedure are identical with the reasons that actually ﬁ g-
ured in the decision-making process. It should be noted that these 
include not only the reasons that actually were decisive but also the 
reasons that were overruled. Th e importance of emphasizing and 
asserting the validity of the latter set of reasons in the procedure 
cannot be underestimated. Th is simply follows from the demand 
that the audience is persuaded that the oﬃ  cial’s decision is the 
upshot of a dilemma that is both real and experienced as such.
Of course, in every process of rendering an account lurks the danger 
of misrepresenting actual decision making. Misrepresentation may 
be deliberate or the result of psychological mechanisms beyond 
conscious control. Th at is why it is important that witnesses are 
heard. Th e fact that testimony is hard to come by if such delibera-
tions are the business of isolated decision makers explains the very 
urgency of this condition. If it is taken seriously, the prospect of 
political forgiveness exerts a disciplining force on the procedure 
of decision making in future cases. Rational justiﬁ cation of deci-
sions ex post facto may constrain the repertoire of considerations fed 
into the decision-making process. Th e public character of politi-
cal forgiveness will, to many decision makers, in itself constitute a 
reason for marshalling adequate reasons for action. As John Stuart 
Mill has it in his Considerations on Representative Government, “To 
be under the eyes of others—to have to defend oneself to others—is 
never more important than to those who act in opposition to the 
opinion of others, for it obliges them to have sure ground of their 
own. … Publicity is inappreciable, even when it does no more than 
prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defended—
than compel deliberation, and force every one to determine, before 
he acts, what he shall say if called to account for his actions” (1875, 
84). Th e chance that one will be politically forgiven may press 
individual decision makers to seek advice, to engage in collective 
deliberation—if the circumstances of the case allow it.
Second, the decision to politically forgive will itself have to be 
publicly supported by adequate reasons. Th e case must be compel-
ling. Th is is important also for subsequent cases. In this way, the 
forgiving institution will gradually build a kind of repertoire of 
deliberative reasoning involved in executive decision making. Th is 
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Notes
1. For a discussion of the implications of this convention for the Abu Ghraib case, 
see Adams, Balfour, and Reed (2006).
2. Th e fact that versions of this conﬂ ict appear in the works of preliberal thinkers 
can be taken as evidence for this deeper source of the conﬂ ict. An example that 
is not proper to liberal democracy is one version of the so-called problem of 
dirty hands (Coady 2008; Kleinig 2007; Meisels 2008; Nagel 1972, 1978; Shue 
1977; Sutherland 2000; Th ompson 1987; Walzer 1973, 2004; Weber 1992). In 
essence, this problem is already dealt with by Augustine in his City of God and, 
of course, Machiavelli, most sharply in the Discourses.
3. An anonymous reviewer suggested that Daschner should have been aware of 
“the need for more of a public process in deciding what to do, which may well 
have led to a diﬀ erent decision.” Even if this were the case, that diﬀ erent decision 
still would have not provided a way out of the dilemma. Th at is the nasty thing 
about this kind of conﬂ ict of value. However, the way the public procedure of 
forgiving is organized should take care that decision makers will want to make 
sure that they have witnesses who will later be capable of reporting the actual 
course of the deliberations. So even if I have reservations in agreeing with the 
reviewer that it is unethical to decide alone, I do believe it is imprudent to do so.
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